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Abstract
Propositional satisfiability (SAT) is at the nucleus of state-of-
the-art approaches to a variety of computationally hard prob-
lems, one of which is cryptanalysis. Moreover, a number of
practical applications of SAT can only be tackled efficiently
by identifying and exploiting a subset of formula’s variables
called backdoor set (or simply backdoors). This paper pro-
poses a new class of backdoor sets for SAT used in the con-
text of cryptographic attacks, namely guess-and-determine at-
tacks. The idea is to identify the best set of backdoor variables
subject to a statistically estimated hardness of the guess-and-
determine attack using a SAT solver. Experimental results on
weakened variants of the renowned encryption algorithms ex-
hibit advantage of the proposed approach compared to the
state of the art in terms of the estimated hardness of the re-
sulting guess-and-determine attacks.
Introduction
During the last two decades, algorithms for solving the
Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) has become one of the
key components of the state-of-the-art approaches to compu-
tational problems from a multitude of practical domains in-
cluding artificial intelligence, software and hardware verifi-
cation, computation biology, among many others. Neverthe-
less, there always remain exceptionally hard SAT instances
that require additional effort to be solved efficiently. A com-
mon way to deal with a hard CNF formula is to attempt to
determine so-called backdoors of the formula. Here, a back-
door or a backdoor set is a subset of variables of the formula
that enables decomposing the original problem into a fam-
ily of “weakened” subproblems, which are relatively easy to
solve (Williams, Gomes, and Selman 2003). Typically, solv-
ing the subproblems requires a polynomial-time algorithm.
A significant upside of backdoor sets is that they often make
it possible to estimate the time required to solve the problem.
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An important practical area that gives birth to exception-
ally hard computational problems is cryptography. More-
over, a number of attempts were made to tackle various
cryptanalysis problems using constraint satisfaction algo-
rithms, e.g. SAT (Mironov and Zhang 2006; De, Kumara-
subramanian, and Venkatesan 2007; Erko¨k and Matthews
2009; Soos, Nohl, and Castelluccia 2009; Tomb 2015) and
CSP (Gerault, Minier, and Solnon 2017).
Most of the cryptanalysis problems can be formulated in
the following way: given a known encryption algorithm and
its known output, one needs to find the corresponding input
of the algorithm. There are a number of cryptographic at-
tacks aiming at solving such problems, an important class of
which comprises guess-and-determine attacks (Bard 2009).
One may immediately notice an explicit relation between
backdoor sets for SAT and guess-and-determine attacks on
cryptographic functions. Indeed, they both follow a simple
strategy: first, “guess” values of the variables from some
(backdoor) set, and then “determine” using a relatively ef-
ficient algorithm whether or not the guess was correct. Usu-
ally, guess-and-determine attacks are constructed as a result
of a thorough analysis of the features of the considered ci-
pher and whether or not they can be exploited by the intrinsic
characteristics of the algorithm used to solve the weakened
cryptanalysis problems.
The present paper investigates application of the state-
of-the-art SAT technologies to automatically constructing
guess-and-determine attacks on relevant encryption algo-
rithms. Unfortunately, in most of the cases backdoors intro-
duced in previous works cannot be applied efficiently for
this purpose. The reason is that for every output of a crypto-
graphic function one essentially has to construct a separate
backdoor set, i.e. it cannot be applied to a family of prob-
lems. Also, in some cases restrictions on the class of under-
lying algorithms (e.g. Strong Backdoors (Williams, Gomes,
and Selman 2003) assume the use polynomial-time proce-
dures) are too severe.
The paper makes the following contributions. First, the
paper proposes a new type of backdoor sets for SAT called
Inverse Backdoor Sets (IBS). It extends the previously in-
troduced notion of Strong Backdoors (Williams, Gomes,
and Selman 2003) towards allowing one to use algorithms
for solving problems from NP as well as incomplete al-
gorithms when solving simplified/weakened subproblems.
Second, the paper introduces a special resistance function
used to estimate a running time of the guess-and-determine
attack corresponding to the specific Inverse Backdoor Set.
Computation of the resistance function is done using the
Monte-Carlo method (Metropolis and Ulam 1949). Third,
borrowing the ideas from blackbox optimization, a general
method is proposed for identifying an IBS with a good run-
time estimation of the corresponding attack by minimizing
the resistance function over the set of all possible IBSes.
The fourth contribution of the paper is that the approach
is applied to constructing guess-and-determine attacks on
several relevant cryptographic systems, such as the Trivium
keystream generator and the weakened variants of the AES-
128 and Magma block ciphers. The runtime estimations of
the constructed attacks push the state of the art.
This paper is organized as follows. First, the next sec-
tion introduces the notation used throughout the paper and
as well briefly describes the problem being studied. Sec-
ond, a new class of Inverse Backdoor Sets is introduced fol-
lowed by a discussion on how to use them when construct-
ing guess-and-determine attacks on cryptographic functions.
Third, we propose the resistance function used to compute
runtime estimations of the constructed guess-and-determine
attacks as well as an automatic way to minimize the re-
sistance function. Finally, the paper gives an overview of
the preliminary experimental results of applying the pro-
posed technology to cryptanalysis of the Trivium, AES, and
Magma ciphers.
Preliminaries
Definitions standard in propositional satisfiability (SAT) are
assumed (Biere et al. 2009). In what follows, C denotes an
arbitrary propositional formula in conjunctive normal form
(CNF), i.e. it is a conjunction of clauses. A clause is a dis-
junction of literals while a literal is either a Boolean vari-
able x or its negation ¬x. Whenever convenient, CNF C is
defined over a set of variables V .
An assignment is a mapping α : V → {0, 1}, which satis-
fies (unsatisfies, resp.) a Boolean variablex ∈ V if α(x) = 1
(α(x) = 0, resp.). Assignments defined for all variables of
V are called complete while assignments defined for a sub-
set B ⊂ V are called partial. Assignments can be extended
in a natural way for literals (l) and clauses (c):
α(l) =
{
α(x), if l = x
1− α(x), if l = ¬x
α(c) = max{α(l) | l ∈ c}
If assignment α satisfies every clause c ∈ C then formula C
is said to be satisfiable and α is called a model for C.
Whenever convenient, an assignment α to variables V is
denoted by the corresponding set of variable values, i.e. α ∈
{0, 1}|V |. Hereinafter and following (Williams, Gomes, and
Selman 2003), assignments are used to substitute the cor-
responding variables with their values followed by the for-
mula simplification. In particular, given a subset of variables
B ⊆ V and an arbitrary partial assignment β ∈ {0, 1}|B|,
the result of substituting the variables of B with their corre-
sponding values of β in formula C is denoted by C[β/B].
In a similar way, given two subsets of variables B ⊆ V and
B′ ⊆ V ,B∩B′ = ∅, and assignments β and β′, a simplified
CNF formula with variablesB and B′ assigned by β and β′
is denoted by C[β/B, β′/B′].
A large spectrum of various combinatorial problems can
be reduced to SAT effectively. A number of cryptanalysis
problems belong to this spectrum. This paper considers the
cryptanalysis problems in the context of the general inver-
sion problem for discrete functions. Hereinafter, a discrete
function is meant to be a total function F : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗ specified by some algorithm M . We consider only
discrete functions specified by polynomial-time algorithms.
An arbitrary polynomial-time algorithm defines the follow-
ing family of functions
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, n ∈ N1. (1)
Definition 1 (Inversion Problem) Given a number n ∈ N1
and some γ ∈ Range f , the inversion problem for function
f (see (1)) defined by a program M consists in computing
α ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. f(α) = γ.
Observe that many cryptanalysis problems can be con-
sidered in this context. Suppose that given a secret key
α ∈ {0, 1}n, f generates a pseudorandom sequence (gen-
erally speaking, of an arbitrary length), which is later used
to encrypt a plaintext with bitwise XOR. Such sequence is
called a keystream. A fragment of the plaintext and the cor-
responding ciphertext identifies a fragment of the keystream,
i.e. some word γ ∈ Rangef , for which we can consider the
inversion problem: to find α ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. f(α) = γ. With
respect to cryptographic keystream generators, the problem
corresponds to the so-called known plaintext attack — the
cryptanalysis of the generator based on the known plain-
text (Menezes, Vanstone, and Oorschot 1996).
Inversion of (1) can be reduced to SAT by considering
a Boolean circuit Sf that defines function f . Each input of
Sf is associated with a distinct Boolean variable xi ∈ X ,
i ∈ [n], i.e. |X | = n. We say that X encodes the input of
function f . Analogously, the output of function f is denoted
by distinct Boolean variables Y = {y1, . . . , ym}, X ∩ Y =
∅. Circuit Sf can be encoded into a CNF formula Cf using
auxiliary variables (Tseitin 1970)
Let Cf be a CNF formula constructed for a circuit Sf as
described above and let γ be a partial assignment for vari-
ables Y s.t. γ ∈ Range f . It can be observed that Cf [γ/Y ]
is satisfiable and from any of its models one can effectively
extract a partial assignment α ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. f(α) = γ.
Given all described above, the basic idea of SAT-based
cryptanalysis is as follows. First, given a known algorithm
M , a fixed n ∈ N1 and a fixed γ ∈ Range f , construct
a CNF Cf [γ/Y ]. Second, apply a SAT solving algorithm
to Cf [γ/Y ]. Third, assuming that it manages to decide the
formula within a reasonable time, extract α ∈ {0, 1}n from
the computed model of Cf [γ/Y ].
Note that although encoding cryptographic algorithms
into SAT seems conceptually simple, in practice it can
be time consuming and non-trivial. For our purposes it
is important to know the input and output variables in
a constructed SAT instance. Also, the encodings must be
arc consistent. Therefore, for this purpose we use an au-
tomatic translator Transalg (Otpuschennikov et al. 2016),
which satisfies all the requirements mentioned above. To
solve the constructed SAT instances, we employ the state-
of-the-art conflict-driven clause learning (CDCL) SAT
solvers (Marques-Silva, Lynce, and Malik 2009).
Let us now proceed to the notion of Backdoor Set for SAT.
The concept of Backdoor Sets and Strong Backdoor Sets in
the context of CSP and SAT was first strictly formalized
in (Williams, Gomes, and Selman 2003).
Definition 2 (Strong Backdoor Set) Let C be an arbitrary
CNF formula over a set of variables V , and let A be a
polynomial-time algorithm. A non-empty set B, B ⊆ V , is
a Strong Backdoor Set for C w.r.t. algorithm A if for each
β ∈ {0, 1}|B| algorithm A decides formula C[β/B].
A simple, but important class of Strong Backdoor Sets is
formed by Strong Unit Propagation Backdoor Sets (SUPBS)
(Williams, Gomes, and Selman 2003). In this case algorithm
A is Unit Propagation (Dowling and Gallier 1984). For ex-
ample the set of input variablesX in Cf is a SUPBS.
Backdoor Sets for Non-polynomial-time
and/or Incomplete Algorithms
The intuition behind Definition 2 is that computing a Strong
Backdoor Set for a SAT problem enables one to predict the
runtime of the complete solving process exploiting the back-
doors. Indeed, it can be computed as the number of all possi-
ble partial assignments for the backdoor variables multiplied
by the time complexity of algorithm A.
Unfortunately, Strong Backdoors are typically either ex-
tremely hard to find, or do not pose any interest because of
their size (and, thus, the number of subproblems to solve).
Here the main restriction is, in fact, the requirement that al-
gorithmAmust have a polynomial complexity. Instead ofA,
one may want to use some complete algorithmA′ that has an
exponential worst-case scenario time complexity but works
well on average. As an example, one could use an NP-oracle,
e.g. SAT- or CSP-solving algorithm, asA′. Clearly, there are
CNF formulas, which can be hard to decide by state-of-the-
art SAT solvers used as blackboxes, but can still be solved by
the partitioning approach, as described in (Hyva¨rinen 2011).
Definition 3 (Non-deterministic Oracle Backdoor Set)
Let A be a complete algorithm and let C be an arbitrary
CNF formula over a set of variables V . A non-empty set
B, B ⊆ V , is a Non-deterministic Oracle Backdoor Set
(NOBS) w.r.t. algorithm A if the total running time of A
given formulas C[β/B], β ∈ {0, 1}|B|, is less than the
running time of A on the original formula C.
NOBS can be seen as a special case of plain partition-
ing (Hyva¨rinen 2011). It is such a set of variables that en-
ables solving a problem faster (by decomposing or partition-
ing it via the backdoor variables) than if the same algorithm
is applied to the original formula. The ”non-deterministic
oracle” part refers to the fact that we can use any algo-
rithm for solving problems fromNP. The Cube-and-Conquer
solvers (Heule et al. 2011) implicitly use an NOBS-like idea:
they employ CDCL solvers to explore branches of the search
tree chosen by e.g. a lookahead solver. In some cases it leads
to spectacular results (Heule, Kullmann, and Marek 2016).
Note that by using NOBS instead of Strong Backdoors
we lose the ability to analytically evaluate the time required
for solving the problem. In practice, this disadvantage can
be alleviated as follows: one can solve a reasonably small
portion of subproblems and use their average solving time to
extrapolate how long it will take to solve all subproblems.
Note that the Backdoor Sets of the introduced type, as
well as Strong Backdoor sets from (Williams, Gomes, and
Selman 2003) are essentially constraint-agnostic and can
be adapted to almost any variants of Constraint Satisfaction
Problems and solving algorithms.
At this point, it is also possible to discard the requirement
that the algorithm is complete. In the reminder of the pa-
per we introduce a new type of backdoor sets following this
paradigm in the context of guess-and-determine attacks on
cryptographic functions and analyze how it can be applied
in practice.
Guess-And-Determine attacks on Cryptographic
Functions
This section describes the interconnection between the pro-
posed Backdoor Sets and guess-and-determine attacks on
cryptographic functions. Let us first discuss the properties
of a cryptographic function. Typically, given a function f(·)
and an arbitrary α as an input, the algorithm that computes
γ = f(α) has polynomial time complexity. It is justified by
the fact that nowadays the amount of data to be encrypted is
increasing every year and, thus, the performance of an en-
crypting algorithm is vital. The second characteristic of a
cryptographic function is that its inversion, i.e. computing α
s.t. f(α) = γ given γ, must be extremely hard (ideally, in-
feasible). Here we are mostly interested in constructing run-
time estimations when solving inversion problems for cryp-
tographic functions by exploiting characteristics of differ-
ent Backdoor Sets. Let us consider the relation between the
known and the proposed Backdoor Sets, as well as guess-
and-determine attacks.
The basic idea of a guess-and-determine attack is quite
simple. Assume that we have a formula C describing a
cryptanalysis problem and V is a set of variables of this for-
mula. Then a guess-and-determine attack is as follows: (i)
“guess” values of the variables from a subset B, B ⊆ V ,
and then (ii) “determine” using a relatively fast algorithm
whether or not the guess was correct. Trivially, this approach
implies doing exhaustive search over 2|B| possible assign-
ments to variables of B. Therefore, in light of cryptanal-
ysis any Backdoor Set mentioned above corresponds to a
guess-and-determine attack. For example, one can observe
that a set of variables encoding an input of a cryptographic
function can serve as its trivial Strong Backdoor. The cor-
responding guess-and-determine attack is a brute force at-
tack on the cryptographic function. Also, for specific ci-
phers there exist less trivial Strong Backdoors. For instance,
(Anderson 1994) proposed such a Strong Backdoor for the
A5/1 keystream generator. Once the variables from the cor-
responding set are assigned, SAT for the resulting subfor-
mula can be solved by Unit Propagation.
Non-deterministic Oracle Backdoor Sets correspond to
cryptographic attacks, where NP-oracles are used to solve
subproblems constructed for a specific Backdoor set. For in-
stance, very similar approach was applied to cryptanalysis
of the widely known Bivium and Trivium ciphers (Eibach,
Pilz, and Vo¨lkel 2008; Semenov and Zaikin 2016; Eibach,
Vo¨lkel, and Pilz 2010; Huang and Lin 2011).
The main goal of the present paper is to develop a method
for automatic construction of guess-and-determine attacks
on cryptographic functions, that would rely on exploiting
backdoor sets in a CNF formula encoding a cryptanaly-
sis problem. Unfortunately, applying Non-deterministic Or-
acle Backdoor sets to constructing formally justified crypto-
graphic attacks has a few major drawbacks. The main one is
that, by definition, for each new output of the considered
function it is necessary to construct a new Backdoor set.
Ideally, we need such a backdoor set that would retain its
properties through all possible pairs of input-output of the
considered cryptographic function.
Taking into account all of the above, let us introduce a new
type of Backdoor sets, designed specifically for solving in-
version problems for cryptographic functions. Consider an
arbitrary function f of form (1). First, encode f to a CNF
formula Cf s.t. sets of variables X and Y represent input
and output of f . Let B be an arbitrary subset ofX and con-
sider some α ∈ {0, 1}|X|. By β(α) we denote a partial as-
signment to variables of B extracted from a specific α. We
say that β(α) is induced by assignment α.
Define a uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. With each α
randomly selected from {0, 1}n we associate assignments
β(α) (induced by α) – values of the Backdoor variables,
and f(α) – an assignment of output variables from Y . Next,
consider a simplified CNF formula Cf [f(α)/Y, β(α)/B].
Clearly, this formula is satisfiable, and from each of its
models one can extract the corresponding partial assignment
α ∈ {0, 1}n. Let A be an arbitrary SAT solving algorithm.
For each triple (α, f(α), β(α)), the running time of A on
formulaCf [f(α)/Y, β(α)/B] is denoted by TA (Cf , B, α).
Let t be a parameter that takes only positive values. For a
fixed t consider the following value:
PB(t) =
# {α ∈ {0, 1}n : TA (Cf , B, α) ≤ t}
2n
(2)
The numerator of (2) depicts a number of such α ∈
{0, 1}n for which CNF formula Cf [f(α/Y, β(α)/B] is de-
cided by A in time ≤ t. The denominator of (2) is the
number of all α. Therefore, (2) is essentially a probability
of the following event: a randomly selected α ∈ {0, 1}n
induces such assignments β(α) and f(α) that A decides
Cf [f(α/Y, β(α)/B] in time ≤ t.
Definition 4 (Inverse Backdoor Set) An arbitrary non-
empty set B, B ⊆ X , |B| = s, with properties described
above is called an Inverse Backdoor Set (IBS) with
parameters (s, t, PB(t)) for Cf w.r.t. algorithm A.
Note that probability (2) is not tied to a specific output of f .
Therefore, any IBS can be used to mount a general guess-
and-determine attack on a cryptographic function.
Now let us describe a guess-and-determine (in the follow-
ing G-a-D) attack strategy that corresponds to IBS B with
parameters (s, t, PB(t)).
Definition 5 (elementary G-a-D attack based on IBS B)
Consider the inversion problem for function f of form (1)
given an arbitrary γ ∈ Range f .
1. Assume that γ = f(α) for some α ∈ {0, 1}n.
2. Let B be an IBS with parameters (s, t, PB(t)) and β ∈
{0, 1}s is an assignment to variables of B.
3. Construct CNF Cf [γ/Y, β/B] and run a SAT solverA on
it.
4. If the runtime of A on this SAT instance exceeds t, inter-
rupt the solving process and move to another β.
5. For β = β(α), an algorithm A will find a model for
Cf [γ/Y, β/B] in time ≤ t with probability PB(t). This
means that A will compute α s.t. f(α) = γ.
It is possible that the analysis of a γ lead to no result (since
on each formula Cf [γ/Y, β/B] the runtime of A exceeded
t). In that case due to the cryptographic context, we can con-
sider another point from Range f that is different from γ.
For example, in application to block ciphers it means that
we need another pair input-output, where input is encrypted
using the secret key applied to produce γ. Thus, we have the
following iterative guess-and-determine attack.
Definition 6 (G-a-D attack, based on IBS B) . Consider
the inversion problem for a function f of form (1).
1. Let γ1, . . . , γr be observed outputs of function f . These
outputs correspond to inputs α1, . . . , αr.
2. Let B be some IBS with parameters (s, t, PB(t)),
PB(t) > 0.
3. A guess-and-determine attack based on IBS B consists in
successive application of elementary attack, as described
in Definition 5, to outputs γ1, . . . , γr.
4. The attack is said to be successful if for at least one j ∈
{1, . . . , r} the corresponding inversion problem for f is
solved.
It is easy to observe that the probability of success of a
proposed guess-and-determine attack on the set of outputs
γ1, . . . , γr is
P ∗r = 1− (1− PB(t))
r
(3)
Thus, assuming that PB(t) > 0, the probability of success
of this attack converges to 1 with the increase of r.
In contrast to guess-and-determine attacks based on
Strong Backdoor sets, it is unclear at first glance how to esti-
mate the running time of an IBS-based attack. However, for
each B its size s is known, and a value of t is specified be-
forehand. Therefore, the main question regarding IBS-based
attacks is how to calculate the value of probability PB(t)
within a reasonable time. The next section will describe the
technique for estimating PB(t) for fixed backdoors B and
time t. It will also introduce the concept of resistance func-
tion for B, whose values are estimations of complexity of
the corresponding guess-and-determine attacks. Finally, it
will reduce the problem of computing an IBS correspond-
ing to attacks with low complexity to minimization of the
resistance function over a Boolean hypercube.
Dealing with IBS
First, let us discuss how to compute the runtime estimation
for a specific IBS.
Assume that when inverting function (1) we consider an
arbitrary IBSB with parameters (s, t, PB(t)). First, we need
to compute the value of probability PB(t). It can not be
done effectively, because according to (2) for this purpose
we would need to know the number of such α ∈ {0, 1}n, for
which the runtime ofA on CNFsCf [f(α)/Y, β(α)/B] does
not exceed t. However, we can use the Monte-Carlo method
(Metropolis and Ulam 1949) to estimate PB(t). The general
idea of the Monte Carlo method is simple. Let ξ be a random
variable. Assume that its expected value E[ξ] and variance
V ar(ξ) are both finite, but unknown and can not be com-
puted in reasonable time. Nevertheless, we want to know
“what to expect” from ξ, i.e. to estimate its expected value
E[ξ]. For this purpose, a random sampling is first performed
by making N independent observations of ξ: ξ1, . . . , ξN .
Then from theCentral Limit theorem (Feller 1971) it follows
that if the size of the random sampleN is large enough, then
the sample mean shown in (4)
ξ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ξj (4)
can be considered as a good approximation of E[ξ].
Let us illustrate this concept. Assume that we have a
CNF C, a Non-deterministic Oracle Backdoor Set B and
use SAT solver A to solve simplified subproblems C[β/B],
β ∈ {0, 1}|B|. Assume that β is chosen from {0, 1}|B| ac-
cording to uniform distribution. Then the runtime ofA given
an arbitrary subproblem C[β/B] can be treated as an ob-
servation of a random variable ξ. Here it is assumed that
the goal is to construct a runtime estimation for solving C
by exploiting B, since the solving itself would require too
much resources. For this, we randomly generate N assign-
ments β1, . . . , βN of variables fromB and track the runtime
of A on C[βj/B], j ∈ {1, . . . , N}: ξj = TA(C[βj/B]).
The sample mean ξ computed according to (4) can be con-
sidered as an estimation of an average time required by A
to solve an average subproblem C[β/B]. By multiplying it
by 2|B|, an estimation of the total time to solve all C[β/B],
β ∈ {0, 1}|B| is constructed.
Now let us return to the problem of estimating PB(t).
Assume that B is an IBS. The goal given randomly cho-
sen input-output pairs γ = f(α) is to estimate what portion
of inversion problems Cf [γ/Y, β(α)/B] can be solved by
algorithm A within time limit t. For this purpose, define a
random variable ξ as follows. For a randomly selected as-
signment α ∈ {0, 1}n the value of ξ = ξA(B,α, t) is equal
to 1 if A solves SAT for CNF Cf [f(α)/Y, β(α)/B] in time
≤ t and 0 otherwise. From (2) it follows that ξ takes val-
ues of 1 and 0 with probabilities PB(t) and 1 − PB(t), re-
spectively. Thus, E[ξ] = PB(t). Since E[ξ] and V ar(ξ) are
both finite, and thus formal requirements of the Monte Carlo
method are satisfied, we can use the following scheme to es-
timate PB(t) for a fixed t.
1. Generate a random sample of assignments α1, . . . αN ,
αj ∈ {0, 1}n, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2. For each αj , construct f(αj) and β(αj), construct CNF
Cf [f(α
j)/Y, β(αj)/B] and run A on it.
3. If within time limit t, algorithmA computes a model, then
ξj = 1, otherwise ξj = 0.
4. Compute sample mean ξ according to (4).
Obviously, the larger the size of a random sample, the better
we can construct the approximation of PB(t). Now that it
is clear how to estimate PB(t) it is possible to move to the
problem of estimating the runtime of an IBS-based attack.
Estimating Runtime of IBS-based attacks
Let us get back to the notion of guess-and-determine attack
defined in Definition 6. Assume that following Definition 6,
we successively apply an elementary guess-and-determine
attack based on B to analyze several outputs γ1, . . . , γr.
Therefore, the total runtime of a corresponding attack is
r × t × 2|B|. However, it is necessary to estimate r: how
many outputs should be analyzed for a considered guess-
and-determine attack to yield a result. For this purpose, we
use formula (2) under the assumption that the probability of
success equal to 95% meets our needs. So it is necessary to
choose r in such a way that P ∗r ≥ 0.95. Since all consid-
ered probabilistic spaces are finite and without loss of gen-
erality, assume that PB(t) is a positive rational number 1/q,
q ≥ 1. Taking into account the fact that for large q it holds
that
(
1− 1
q
)q
≈ e−1 ≈ 0.3678, it follows from (2) that the
probability P ∗r exceeds 0.95 when r ≈
3
PB(t)
. Using sample
mean ξ as an estimation of PB(t) we derive the following
definition.
Definition 7 Assume that there is an IBSB with parameters
(s, t, PB(t)). The following function
G(B) = 2s × t×
3
ξ
, (5)
is referred to as resistance function.
Here, “resistance” should be understood as cryptographic
resistance to IBS-based attacks. By definition, the value of a
resistance function for an IBSB is the runtime estimation of
the corresponding guess-and-determine attack based on B.
In the following subsection we propose the algorithm that
can be used to find a good IBS via minimization of the re-
sistance function over all possible IBSes. We use this algo-
rithm to automatically construct IBS-based attacks on sev-
eral state-of-the-art cryptographic functions.
Minimizing the Resistance Function
The minimization problem for the resistance function is
complicated by the fact that this function is not specified
analytically. Another distinctive feature of this function is
that computing its value in some point requires tracking the
runtime of the employed algorithm A. In fact, tackling such
functions is a common problem in the area of blackbox op-
timization, where a function is treated as a blackbox, which
given some input produces some output according to its (un-
known) design.
Note that computing the resistance function in one point is
actually quite expensive: if we use a random sample of size
N and time limit t, in the worst case it takes N × t to com-
pute its value. Therefore, first, it is undesirable to compute
the function in a point of the search space more than once.
Second, in practice, the number of points to be processed is
limited by the amount of available computational resources.
Thus, it is convenient to minimize the resistance function
by a combination of Tabu search (Glover and Laguna 1997)
heuristics with some variant of local search. Tabu search
uses a Tabu list, where the algorithm stores all points for
which the function value was computed. Therefore, before
computing the value of the function in the next point, it first
checks whether or not this point is already in the Tabu list.
Let us formally describe the minimization algorithm. As-
sume that there is a CNF formulaCf specifying some inver-
sion problem. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of Boolean
variables encoding the input of f . An arbitrary subset B
of X can be described using Boolean vector χ = χ(B) =
(χ1, . . . , χn), where for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
χi =
{
1, xi ∈ B
0, xi /∈ B
Thus, the search space can be defined as an n-dimensional
Boolean hypercube En = {0, 1}n. For an arbitrary point
χ ∈ En, a neighborhoodNh(χ) of radius R is defined as a
set of such points χ′, χ
′
∈ En, that dH(χ, χ′) ≤ R, where
dH(χ, χ
′) stands for Hamming distance between χ and χ′
(in this work we considered radius R = 1).
Note that set B = X is an IBS with PB(t) = 1 for some
small t. Indeed, in this case for each α ∈ {0, 1}n it follows
that β(α) = α, and, therefore, SAT for an arbitrary CNF
formula Cf [f(α)/Y, α/X ] can be solved using only Unit
Propagation. This means that it is always possible to start
the process of minimizing (5) from the point χstart = 1
n
(i.e. the vector of all 1s), corresponding to X .
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code of the algorithm. We
denote the current point, a neighborhood of which is be-
ing processed, as χcenter , the current Best Known Value
of (5) as Gbest, the corresponding χ as χbest. Function
Resistance(χ,t) computes the value of the resistance
function for Backdoor B, corresponding to point χ, with
the time limit t. Function UpdateTabuList(χ) adds the
corresponding point to the Tabu list. The algorithm uses
function GetNewCenter() to exit local minima. Func-
tion TimeExceeded() checks if the time limit of the al-
gorithm is exceeded (in our experiments we used the time
limit of 1 day).
Preliminary Experimental Results
All experiments were run on 10 nodes of a computing clus-
ter, each node being equipped with two Intel Xeon E5-
2695 v4 CPUs and 128 GB RAM. All presented runtime es-
timations are scaled to one core of the aforementioned CPU.
During the resistance function minimization, we used ran-
dom samples of size 1000. This choice represents a compro-
mise: on the one hand, the larger the sample size is, the more
Algorithm 1: Tabu search algorithm for minimization of
the resistance function
Input: CNF formula Cf , time limit t
Output: χbest with the runtime estimation Gbest
1 χbest ← χcenter ← 1n
2 Gbest ← G(1n)
3 repeat
4 NewOptimum ← false
5 repeat
6 χ← UncheckedPoint (Nh(χcenter))
7 g ← Resistance(χ, t)
8 UpdateTabuList(χ)
9 if g < Gbest then
10 〈χbest, Gbest〉 ← 〈χ, g〉
11 NewOptimum ← true
12 until All points in Nh(χcenter) are checked
13 if NewOptimum then χcenter ← χbest
14 else χcenter ← GetNewCenter()
15 until TimeExceeded()
16 return 〈χbest, Gbest〉
accurate the results of the Monte Carlo method are. On the
other hand, if we use samples of a larger size, the perfor-
mance of traversing the search space is greatly hampered.
However, in order to ensure the consistency of the obtained
results, for every computed IBS Bbest, the value of the re-
sistance function was recomputed using random samples of
increasing size up to 100000.
When searching for best IBSs, the values of PB and t typ-
ically were in intervals PB ∈ [0.05, 1], t ∈ [1s, 200s]. The
intuition here is simple: if PB is too small, then the impact
of randomness on the resistance function’s value is too large.
During the empirical evaluation, PB < 0.05 turned out to
lead to significant deviations of the resistance function’s val-
ues computed using random samples of increasing size. As
for t, when it is small then SAT solvers cannot fully employ
all their capabilities; and when t is too large, the proposed
method becomes computationally too expensive.
Experimental results were obtained using the ROKK SAT
solver (Yasumoto and Okuwaga 2014). This non-standard
choice is a result of a rigorous evaluation comparing top
CDCL solvers from SAT competitions 2014–2016 (on the
formulas studied in this work), including ROKK, lingeling,
Cryptominisat, etc. Surprisingly, ROKK turned out to be the
winner.
Below we show the results of constructing guess-and-
determine attacks on 3 widely known symmetric ciphers.
The first one is the Trivium stream cipher (Cannie`re 2006). It
is one of the winners of eSTREAM, which is a project aimed
at identifying new stream ciphers suitable for widespread
use. We considered the problem of recovering initial states
of the Trivium registers (288 bits in total) for a known 300-
bit keystream fragment.
The second benchmark is the problem of finding a se-
cret key given three blocks of known plaintext (3KP) for
the reduced version of the AES-128 block cipher. 3KP are
needed to ensure the probability (3) to be ≥ 95%. AES-128
is originally a 10-round Substitution Permutation Network.
The full-round AES is one of the most cryptographically re-
sistant state-of-the-art ciphers. The majority of the known
attacks with the runtime significantly smaller than that of
the exhaustive search are designed only for AES with re-
duced numbers of rounds. We studied the 2.5-round version
of AES-128 (following the notation of (Bouillaguet, Derbez,
and Fouque 2011), “x.5r” means x full rounds and the final
round).
Finally, we studied the problem of finding a secret key
given 12 blocks of the known plaintext (12KP) and the cor-
responding ciphertext for the reduced version of the Magma
cipher (GOST 28147-89). This cipher was used in the USSR
and Russia from 1989 to 2015. Originally, Magma is a 32-
round cipher based on the Feistel network architecture. Sim-
ilar to AES, significant improvements in cryptanalysis of
Magma compared to the brute force attacks are known only
for reduced-round variants of the Magma cipher. We stud-
ied the 8-round variant of Magma. For ensuring (3) to be
≥ 95%, we need 12 blocks of known plaintext.
The estimations of the guess-and-determine attacks con-
structed by our method for the considered ciphers are
showed in Table 1. The sizes of the corresponding IBS sets
are |B| = 131 (out of |X | = 288) for Trivium, |B| = 63
(out of |X | = 256) for Magma and |B| = 42 (out of
|X | = 128) for AES.
Trivium. In (Borghoff, Knudsen, and Matusiewicz 2010)
a guess-and-determine attack on Trivium is a result of solv-
ing a discrete optimization problem over a Boolean hyper-
cube. In contrast to our generic method, the approach of
Borghoff et al. targets only the cryptanalysis equations for
Trivium and does not apply a general technique or method
for constructing guess-and-determine attacks on a large class
of cryptographic functions. Also, in (Borghoff, Knudsen,
and Matusiewicz 2010) the effectiveness of a guess-and-
determine attack is estimated in a completely different way
if compared with the proposed resistance function. Borghoff
et al. proposed an attack with the estimation of 4.31e+55
seconds. A guess-and-determine attack on Trivium with the
smallest runtime estimation is described in (Huang and Lin
2011), which uses the “Characteristic Set method” (CS-
method) for solve the Trivium cryptanalysis equations. Al-
thoughwe acknowledge that the method proposed in (Huang
and Lin 2011) outperforming the approach of the present
paper (applied to Trivium) is somewhat discouraging, note
that (Huang and Lin 2011) did not propose a versatile au-
tomatic procedure applicable to other ciphers (in contrast to
our approach of resistance function minimization).
AES-128. To our best knowledge, the state-of-the-art
guess-and-determine attacks on AES-128 with a reduced
number of rounds were proposed in (Bouillaguet, Derbez,
and Fouque 2011). Bouillaguet et al. considered a set of all
possible sets of guessed bits as a tree traversed in a way
similar to the branch-and-bound method. They claim that
their method “... is reminiscent of the DPLL procedure im-
Table 1: Estimated hardness of the guess-and-determine at-
tacks for weakened variants of Trivium, AES, and Magma
compared to Previous Best Attacks (PBA), i.e. see (Huang
and Lin 2011) for Trivium, (Bouillaguet, Derbez, and
Fouque 2011) for AES, and (Courtois, Gawinecki, and Song
2012) for Magma. Time complexity is measured in seconds
scaled to one core of the Intel Xeon E5-2695 v4 CPU while
memory is measured in bits. Here by “negligible” we mean
the amount of memory, which is standard for a modern PC.
Cipher Time Memory Reference
Trivium 2.04e+41 negligible present paper
2.50e+34 negligible PBA
AES-128 1.45e+15 negligible present paper
3.08e+16 280 PBA
Magma 3.55e+22 negligible present paper
1.17e+23 negligible PBA
plemented in many SAT-solvers”. However, their approach
does not use SAT solvers. Also, they do not estimate the
runtime of a guess-and-determine attack similarly to what
is done in the present paper: by analyzing the performance
of an algorithm for solving a set of weakened cryptanaly-
sis instances. (Bouillaguet, Derbez, and Fouque 2011) con-
sidered the cryptanalysis of a truncated AES-128 (with 2.5
rounds), in which 2KP are analyzed. The main disadvantage
of this method consists in an enormous amount of memory
consumption. In all our estimations the amount of memory
required is a tiny fraction of the required runtime.
Magma. In (Courtois, Gawinecki, and Song 2012) the
Magma cipher was studied by SAT solvers. To estimate
the performance of guess-and-determine attacks, Courtois
et al. introduced the notions of SAT-immunity and UNSAT-
immunity, which, however, were not strictly formalized. Our
notion of resistance function can be seen as a concretization
of the notion of SAT-immunity. The attack of Courtois et al.
(see its running time in Table 1) was constructed as a result
of a thorough analysis of the Magma design features with-
out using automatic algorithms for constructing guess-and-
determine attacks. Note, that in (Courtois, Gawinecki, and
Song 2012) 4KP were analyzed, while our attack requires
12KP in accordance with the aforementioned reasons. How-
ever, the runtime estimation of our attack is lower.
Conclusions
The paper studies a new class of Backdoors Sets for SAT
(Inverse Backdoor Sets, IBS), which aims at facilitating effi-
cient cryptographic attacks, namely guess-and-determine at-
tacks. The values of the backdoor variables are used as bits
to guess in the proposed guess-and-determine attack. The
efficiency/hardness of the attack is defined as a value of a
specific resistance function, which is estimated statistically
using the Monte-Carlo method. The idea of the proposed ap-
proach is to identify the best set of backdoor variables sub-
ject to the hardness of the guess-and-determine attack, i.e.
the value of the resistance function, using a SAT solver. Pre-
liminary experimental results indicate that the proposed ap-
proach pushes the state of the art in the estimating hardness
of the guess-and-determine attack for a number of weakened
variants of the known encryption algorithms, namely AES
and Magma.
The following lines of future work can be envisioned.
First, one can extend the proposed IBS-based guess-and-
determine attacks taking into account not only the variables
encoding the algorithm’s input but also the auxiliary vari-
ables introduced by the encoding process. Second, the new
class of backdoors is general enough to be readily adapted
to other classes of hard SAT formulas, e.g. in the context of
parallel and distributed SAT solving, as well as other types
of constraints. Third, in order to estimate the hardness of
a guess-and-determine attack based on some backdoor set,
it seems plausible to adapt known deterministic measures,
e.g. to analyze “current space complexity” (Anso´tegui et al.
2008), instead of running time.
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